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On behalf of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, we are pleased to present this report, 
“Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees?” by Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn.
Competitive sourcing is the competition between government and private sector providers related to the 
undertaking of the federal government’s commercial activities. To date, the impact on federal employees has 
been subject to speculation based largely on anecdotal evidence. Other than a few limited studies by the 
RAND Corporation and the Government Accountability Office, little empirical evidence has been analyzed 
about the impact of competitive sourcing on federal employees. As a result, many federal agencies are often 
reluctant to undertake competitive sourcing initiatives because many employees and their unions fear signifi-
cant loss of federal jobs.
But what actually happens to federal employees when competitive sourcing is undertaken? To understand 
the impact, Gansler and Lucyshyn examined all A-76 competitions the Department of Defense conducted 
from 1994 through the first quarter of 2004. Based on their analysis of almost 1,200 competitions, they drew 
a number of significant conclusions. First, they found that most claims of the negative impact of competitive 
sourcing on federal employees are unfounded. Of the 65,157 civilian positions studied since 1995, only  
5 percent were reduced through involuntary separation. Second, the data affirmed previous research on the 
significant benefits of competitive sourcing. They found an average estimated savings of 44 percent of baseline 
costs, for a total of $11.2 billion. Third, the study found that since 1999 in-house bids have increased their 
“win rate,” and that by 2003 government won nearly twice as many competitions as did private sector con-
tractors. The authors believe this trend could reduce the number of involuntary separations in the future, since 
such separations are less likely to occur when government wins the competition than when a contractor wins.
While Gansler and Lucyshyn conclude that the number of employees involuntarily separated from competi-
tive sourcing is low, they also discuss the importance of “soft-landing” programs, which provide separated 
employees with the resources necessary to make the transition to other employment. They provide four case 
examples that illustrate how managers have used extensive planning and creative bid solicitation techniques 
to minimize negative impacts due to separation of employment. The authors conclude with five recommen-
dations for agency leaders and managers conducting competitions.  
We trust that this report will be informative and useful during the continued debate over the future of com-
petitive sourcing in government. 
Paul Lawrence Jonathan D. Breul 
Partner-in-Charge Senior Fellow  
IBM Center for The Business of Government IBM Center for The Business of Government 
paul.lawrence@us.ibm.com  jonathan.d.breul@us.ibm.com
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Competitive sourcing has proven to be effective 
in improving the quality of government services 
while lowering the cost for taxpayers. While both 
the Clinton and Bush administrations have encour-
aged competition between in-house and contractor 
providers, federal employees and their advocates 
claim that competition with the private sector leads 
to massive government layoffs; and that has made 
many agencies reticent to undertake such initiatives. 
Although there have been previous studies on the 
impact of competitive sourcing on federal employ-
ees, they have been limited in number and scope. 
This report examines the actual impact of com-
petitive sourcing on employees through data pro-
vided by the Commercial Activities Management 
Information System (CAMIS), a database that tracks 
competitive sourcing initiatives in the Department 
of Defense (DoD), where the vast majority of com-
petitions have occurred.
In examining DoD data, it is clear that much of the 
claims of the negative impact of competitive sourc-
ing on federal employees are unfounded. Of the 
65,157 civilian positions studied since 1995, only 
5 percent were reduced through the involuntary 
separation of federal employees. Instead, positions 
were more likely to be reduced in the winning bids 
through the transfer of employees to other govern-
ment jobs or through early retirement. 
The CAMIS data also affirmed previous research on 
the benefits of competition, as estimated savings in 
the winning bids averaged 44 percent of baseline 
costs. Much of these savings were due to increased 
efficiency, as bids averaged 39 percent fewer civil-
ian positions than were initially studied for compe-
tition. And while contractors won a slight majority 
of these competitions (56 percent), the number of 
winning in-house bids has been rising steadily over 
the past few years. By 2003, in-house bidders won 
Common Concerns
• The cost of government services will be higher. 
•  Large numbers of government employees will  
be involuntarily separated. 
•  Contractors have a significant advantage  
in competitions. 
Study Findings
• Competitions resulted in an average estimated 
savings of 44 percent of baseline costs (with either 
improved performance or no decrease).
•  Only an average of 5 percent of DoD jobs com-
peted resulted in involuntary separation.
•  Since 1999, in-house bids have increased their 
win rate and, by 2003, won nearly twice as many 
competitions as contractors.




nearly twice as many competitions as contractors. 
This trend could reduce the number of involuntary 
separations, since an in-house win generally results 
in fewer employee displacements. 
Though CAMIS data have demonstrated that only a 
small percentage of federal employees are involun-
tarily separated as a result of competitive sourcing, 
it is still important for government agencies to pro-
vide these employees with the resources necessary 
to transition to other employment. There are several 
“soft-landing” programs, such as explicit consider-
ation in the competitive solicitation, career transi-
tion assistance, early retirement, and severance pay, 
offered by the federal government to assist employ-
ees. Thus, this report also includes four case studies 
that illustrate how managers have used extensive 
planning and creative solicitation tactics to prevent 
unnecessary layoffs and minimize the negative 
impacts of introducing market-based government 
sourcing approaches on their employees. 
Finally, the report concludes with five recom-
mendations that are based on this analysis of 
available data.  
• Agency managers should continue pursuing 
competitive sourcing; the performance gains 
and cost savings, along with the small num-
ber of involuntary separations of government 
employees, clearly warrant it.
• Senior agency leadership, when planning for 
competitive sourcing competitions, should 
ensure that the potential impact on employees 
is identified as a high priority. 
• Agency leaders and managers should know 
and use all the available tools, alternatives, and 
techniques to minimize any negative impact on 
affected employees. 
• Managers can and should look at innovative 
ways to offer employees a smooth transition in 
the event of involuntary separation.
• Agency leaders and managers should continu-
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Introduction
“The longstanding policy of the federal government 
has been to rely on the private sector for needed 
commercial services. To ensure that the American 
people receive maximum value for their tax dol-
lars, commercial activities should be subject to the 
forces of competition.“
 OMB Circular No. A-76, May 29, 2003
Overview
Nearly half of federal employees perform activi-
ties that are readily available commercially.1 When 
these tasks, such as payroll services, administrative 
support, and maintenance functions, are competed 
between the public and private sectors, the federal 
government has achieved significant performance 
improvements and savings, ranging between 20 
and 50 percent (with an average of well over 30 
percent)—regardless of whether the winner of the 
competition is the public or the private sector. 
There remains a great deal of resistance and con-
troversy to competing these functions from most 
federal employees, their unions, their political 
allies, and even their government managers. They 
often view “competitive sourcing” as an assault on 
federal employees by shifting federal jobs to the 
private sector, and managers fear a loss of control 
over the work. The controversy heightened when 
the Bush administration announced a major com-
petitive sourcing initiative in 2001. 
The overarching objective of competitive sourc-
ing is to improve the effectiveness of the federal 
government by introducing competition and, wher-
ever possible, eliminating monopolies. Where a 
monopoly exists, innovation and improvement are 
typically discouraged. 
Nor is there a loss of government control, since 
the government is still responsible for providing 
high-quality performance within the quoted costs. 
However, competitive sourcing does have a poten-
tially adverse effect on employees whose jobs have 
been competed. This study examines available data 
to determine the nature and scope of that impact.
Background
Competitive sourcing occurs when government 
and private sector providers compete to carry 
out commercial government activities. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 
defines a commercial activity as a product or service 
provided by the federal government that could be 
provided by a private sector source. A-76 outlines 
the procedures and guidance for federal execu-
tive agencies to evaluate whether these commer-
cial activities should be performed by government 
sources, by private sector sources, or by another 
federal agency through an Interservice Support 
Agreement (ISSA).2
Competitive sourcing is distinctly different from 
privatization, outsourcing, or contracting out. These 
sourcing options assume that the private sector can 
provide less costly, higher quality services than 
the public sector; whereas competitive sourcing 
assumes that competition between the two pro-
viders leads to improved quality at lower cost—




Competitive sourcing, in its most basic form, has 
been employed by federal agencies for almost 40 
years in an effort to improve the quality and flexibil-
ity of government services and to save tax dollars. 
In 1966, OMB issued Circular A-76, which defined 
the formal process whereby federal agencies com-
pete for the provision of goods and services with the 
private sector. Since then, OMB has further defined 
and revised the procedures for agencies to follow 
when competing commercial activities between in-
house and private sector bidders. 
Administrations have varied in their commitment to 
competitive sourcing. On average, over 16,000 posi-
tions per year were studied for competition under 
Reagan, 5,200 positions per year under George H. W. 
Bush, and 7,000 positions per year under Clinton.4 
The current Bush administration demonstrated its 
commitment to the competitive process with a 2001 
mandate for all agencies to compete half of the 
current federal jobs deemed commercial in nature. 
Agencies competed 17,595 full-time equivalents 
(FTEs) in fiscal year (FY) 2003 and had 7,385 FTEs in 
studies (the term of art for these A-76 competitions) 
ongoing as of September 30, 2003.5 
Competitive sourcing has its proponents, sup-
ported by data that show that managed competi-
tions not only improve quality and effectiveness 
but also result in significant cost savings. A recent 
IBM Center for The Business of Government report6 
reviewed research on competitive sourcing and 
noted the following trends: 
• Expected savings from DoD competitions aver-
aged around 31 percent between 1975 and 
1993 and rose to an average of 42 percent 
between 1994 and 2001. 
• Savings from A-76 competitions were sustained 
over time. 
The Commercial Activities Management Information System 
CAMIS is an interactive web-based relational database used throughout DoD. It provides information on studies 
performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-76, and it is used to answer all questions from Congress or DoD 
regarding these studies. Each service and Defense agency maintains its own version of CAMIS, although each 
system must contain DoD’s required minimum set of data elements for individual A-76 competitions. Elements 
include numbers and length of individual competitions, numbers of military and in-house civilian positions 
affected, in-house and contractor estimated costs, cost comparison decision dates, and changes in costs for five 
years after a contract award. DoD also requires each component to enter the original manpower baseline cost of 
the function and the estimated dollar savings from each of the competitions into CAMIS and to track actual costs 
from the completed competitions for five years.
The major sections are:
• Initiative Administration: Administrative information and initiative status regarding the specific DoD CAMIS 
record.
• Phase 1—Start-Up: This phase includes the CAMIS data required to create and begin an initiative. The last ele-
ment in this phase is the public announcement.
• Phase 2—In-Progress: This phase includes the CAMIS data related to performing the initiative. It begins with 
the establishment of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and Management Plan Study Teams and ends 
with the submission of the private sector offers.
• Phase 3—Decision: This phase includes the CAMIS data to document decisions, beginning with the tentative 
decision, includes resolution of all disputes, and ends with the announcement of the final decision.
• Phase 4—Post-Decision: This phase includes CAMIS data that track the actual execution of a final cost com-
parison decision. It includes transition actions, service provider information, and post-MEO (most efficient 
organization) review information.
Users with data-entry privileges enter data into the system throughout the life cycle of the A-76 process, from  
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• Performance either remains the same or 
improves after competitions, as long as it is a 
consideration in the process. 
• Average time to complete studies decreased 
over time. 
• The percentage of employees involuntary sepa-
rated from competitions is low, generally in the 
single digits.
Despite the growing evidence cited that competi-
tive sourcing improves performance and decreases 
cost, strong opposition to the initiative remains. This 
opposition derives primarily from federal employ-
ees, their unions, their political allies, and, more 
recently, civil rights groups—all of whom are fearful 
of losing federal jobs. In 2003, 35 senators signed 
a letter to Mitch Daniels, then director of OMB, 
responding to the administration’s competitive 
sourcing initiative by stating that they have “deep 
reservations about privatizing so much of the federal 
workforce.”7 
As in any large managerial initiative, one can 
find isolated examples of poor execution. In the 
past year, for example, several competitions have 
received media attention and have served as light-
ning rods for controversy over the administration’s 
mandate. When the National Naval Medical Center 
in Bethesda considered contracting out services 
provided by 21 federal employees, all mentally 
handicapped, it attracted political attention to the 
competition. Concerns were expressed in the press 
over whether the federal hiring preferences for the 
disabled, veterans, and other disadvantaged groups 
should be dismissed whenever lower cost contract-
ing options are available.8 The controversy eventu-
ally led the Navy to postpone the study. A similar 
public outcry occurred when 530 federal employees 
at DoD lost a competition to a contractor because 
of an accounting error—which overestimated the 
in-house labor costs by $31.8 million. Subsequently, 
DoD decided not to reopen the competition, and 
the work remained with the contractor.9 Even though 
examples of poorly executed competitions do exist, 
the vast majority of the competitions held over the 
last 10 years that are analyzed in this report have 
achieved their performance and cost goals, while 
minimizing the negative impacts to federal employees. 
To date, the impact of competitive sourcing on 
federal employees has been subject to specula-
tion based largely on anecdotal evidence, with the 
exception of limited studies performed by RAND10 
and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).11 
This report will expand the research on the impact 
of competitive sourcing on federal employees by 
examining all the A-76 competitive sourcing initia-
tives conducted by DoD from 1994 through the first 
quarter of 2004. DoD is the department with, by far, 
the most competitive sourcing activity,12 and it has 
maintained data on each competition within CAMIS. 
CAMIS data, hereafter referred to as the data, pro-
vide information on the impact of the competitions 
on civilian employees, including how many employ-
ees retired, transferred to other government jobs, or 
were involuntarily laid off. In addition, the data also 
include information on estimated savings of the win-
ning bids and the number of positions reduced from 
the initial civilian authorization.
Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply indebted to Joe Sykes and 
Lorna Delay, both of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, for their cooperation and access to CAMIS 
data, without which this research would not have 
been possible. 
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 
expressed or implied are solely those of the authors 
and do not represent the views of the Department  
of Defense or any other agency of the federal  
government.
Activity. A specific task or grouping of tasks that pro-
vides a specialized capability, service, or product based 
on a recurring government requirement. Depending on 
the grouping of tasks, an activity may be an entire func-
tion or may be a part of a function. An activity may be 
inherently governmental or commercial in nature.
Adversely Affected Employees. Federal civilian employ-
ees serving competitive or excepted service appoint-
ments in Tenure Groups I, II, or III, who are identified 
for release from their competitive level by an agency, in 
accordance with 5 C.F.R. Part 351 and 5 U.S.C. Chapter 
35, as a direct result of a performance decision resulting 
from a streamlined or standard competition. 
Agency Source. A service provider staffed by govern-
ment personnel.
Civilian Employee. An individual who works for a fed-
eral agency on an appointment without time limitation 
who is paid from appropriated funds, which include 
working capital funds. A foreign national employee, 
temporary employee, term employee, non-appropriated 
fund employee, or uniformed personnel is not included 
in this definition.
Commercial Activity. A recurring service that could be 
performed by the private sector. This recurring service 
is an agency requirement that is funded and con-
trolled through a contract, fee-for-service agreement, 
or performance by government personnel. Commercial 
activities may be found within, or throughout, organi-
zations that perform inherently governmental activities 
or classified work. 
Competition. A formal evaluation of sources to provide 
a commercial activity that uses preestablished rules (e.g., 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], OMB Circular 
A-76). Competitions between private sector sources are 
performed in accordance with the FAR. Competitions 
between agency, private sector, and public reimbursable 
sources are performed in accordance with the FAR and 
A-76. The term “competition” as used in A-76 includes 
streamlined and standard competitions performed in 
accordance with A-76 and FAR-based competitions for 
agency-performed activities, contracted services, new 
requirements, expansions of existing work, and activi-
ties performed under fee-for-service agreement. The term 
also includes cost comparisons, streamlined cost com-
parisons, and direct conversions performed under previ-
ous versions of OMB Circular A-76.
End Date. The end date for a streamlined or standard 
competition is the date that all standard competition 
form (SCF) certifications are completed, signifying an 
agency’s performance decision.
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE). The staffing of federal civil-
ian employee positions, expressed in terms of annual 
productive work hours (1,776) rather than annual avail-
able hours that includes nonproductive hours (2,080 
hours). FTEs may reflect civilian positions that are not 
necessarily staffed at the time of public announcement, 
and staffing of FTE positions may fluctuate during a 
streamlined or standard competition. The staffing and 
threshold FTE requirements stated in A-76 reflect the 
workload performed by these FTE positions, not the 
workload performed by actual government personnel. 
FTEs do not include military personnel, uniformed ser-
vices, or contract support.
Government Personnel. Civilian employees, foreign 
national employees, temporary employees, term 
employees, non-appropriated fund employees, and uni-
formed services personnel employed by an agency to 
perform activities. 
Inherently Governmental Activities. An activity that is 
so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by government personnel as provided by 
OMB Circular A-76 Attachment A. 
Inventory. A list of government personnel, by location, 
function, and position, performing either commercial 
activities or inherently governmental activities. 
Military Personnel. Officers (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 
§ 101(b)(1)) and enlisted members (as defined in 10 
U.S.C. § 101(b)(6)) of the military services (defined as 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps).
Most Efficient Organization (MEO). The staffing plan of 
the agency tender, developed to represent the agency’s 
most efficient and cost-effective organization. An MEO 
is required for a standard competition and may include 
a mix of government personnel and MEO subcontracts.
Performance Work Statement (PWS). A statement in 
the solicitation that identifies the technical, functional, 
and performance characteristics of the agency’s require-
ments. The PWS is performance based and describes 
the agency’s needs (the “what”), not specific methods 
for meeting those needs (the “how”). The PWS identifies 
essential outcomes to be achieved, specifies the agen-
cy’s required performance standards, and specifies the 




Glossary of Terms continued
Privatization. A federal agency decision to change a gov-
ernment-owned and government-operated commercial 
activity or enterprise to private sector control and owner-
ship. When privatizing, the agency eliminates associated 
assets and resources (manpower for and funding of the 
requirement). Since there is no government ownership 
and control, no service contract or fee-for-service agree-
ment exists between the agency and the private sector 
after an agency privatizes a commercial activity or enter-
prise. Moving work from agency performance with gov-
ernment personnel to private sector performance where 
the agency still funds the activity is not privatization.
Study. A term of art used by the government to cover  
A-76 competitions.
Source. One of three specific categories of service pro-
viders (agency, private sector, or public reimbursable)  
that can perform a commercial activity for an agency.





Understanding Competitive Sourcing: 
Recent History
Recent Initiatives That Affect 
Competitive Sourcing
The amount of competitive sourcing activity, or other 
sourcing initiatives that potentially require a reduc-
tion in force, depends in large part on the enthusi-
asm of the administration in power. Both the Clinton 
and George W. Bush administrations supported 
efforts to reduce the size of government and subject 
public services to competition with the private sec-
tor. This section outlines their respective initiatives. 
The Clinton Administration’s Downsizing and 
A-76 Initiatives
One of the first initiatives of the Clinton administra-
tion was to conduct a six-month study identified  
as the National Performance Review (NPR). The 
goal was to create a government that works better 
and costs less. The NPR recognized that the gov-
ernment, “… built around a complex cluster of 
monopolies, insulates both managers and workers 
from the power of incentives.” One of the tools 
available to improve the effectiveness of govern-
ment was to make government service organiza-
tions compete with each other as well as with the 
private sector:
… We will make agencies compete for 
their customers’ business. Wherever fea-
sible, we will dismantle government’s 
monopolies, including those that buy 
goods and services, acquire and maintain 
office space, and print public documents. 
These internal monopolies serve their 
customers—government workers—so 
poorly, it’s no wonder those workers have 
such trouble serving customers outside 
government. 
As a result of the review, the Clinton administration 
strongly supported efforts to reengineer the govern-
ment, downsize the federal workforce, and empha-
size competing government services.14 
The Clinton administration’s competitive sourcing 
initiatives were focused primarily on DoD. In 1995, 
the administration pressed for more competitions to 
achieve its NPR goals, as well as to cut costs and 
generate funds to modernize aging military equip-
ment.15 OMB estimated that, as a result of these 
A-76 studies, DoD would save $9.2 billion in oper-
ating costs between 1997 and 2005.16 While these 
estimated savings give a sense of the amount of 
competitive sourcing that occurred under Clinton, 
the administration’s downsizing initiatives also 
yielded data and lessons learned regarding their 
impact on federal employees. 
In 1994, President Clinton, with congressional 
support, created a major reengineering initiative 
with the goal of decreasing federal employment 
by nearly 300,000 positions in management and 
administrative support services. The administration’s 
initiative encouraged agencies to minimize invol-
untary separations, as well as to utilize existing 
employees in more efficient ways to support the 
agency’s mission.  
While downsizing is not the objective of competi-
tive sourcing—competitive sourcing uses competi-
tion to produce the most cost-effective method 
14
COMPETITIVE SOURCING
IBM Center for The Business of Government
of service provision—a 1998 report by the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) on the Clinton 
downsizing initiatives contains some valuable les-
sons.17 First, the report found that agencies were 
able to significantly downsize their workforce using 
a variety of tools, such as voluntary early retirement 
and voluntary separation, and thereby minimize 
involuntary separations. Also, government-wide and 
agency-specific priority-rehire programs facilitated 
the placement of surplus employees. Second, while 
minimizing the need for involuntary separations, 
agencies were able to achieve workforce reduc-
tions and also prevent a disproportionate impact on 
women and minorities in the federal workforce. The 
ratio of both minorities and women in the federal 
workforce increased slightly during the period of the 
study. Finally, the report also concluded that early 
and continual communication between managers 
and employees is critical when employee reductions 
are necessary. Ineffective communication can lead 
to a destabilized workforce, one without an under-
standing of any strategic vision for the restructured 
organization. 
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 
1998 (P.L. 105-270)
The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) 
was signed by President Clinton on October 19, 
1998. The FAIR Act required federal agencies to 
inventory the number of federal positions con-
sidered commercial and for OMB to review and 
publish the results. The fact that all federal execu-
tive agencies are reporting this information enables 
OMB to understand the potential scope of A-76 
competitions and see where agencies are failing or 
succeeding in properly applying commercial activity 
designations. 
The following are key provisions contained in the 
FAIR Act:
• The first statutory definition of inherently gov-
ernmental—“a function that is so intimately 
related to the public interest as to require per-
formance by Federal Government employees”
•  A requirement that each agency submit annually 
to OMB a list of commercial activities currently 
being performed by federal employees, and this 
list must be made available to the public
•  The authority for an agency, when consider-
ing contracting with the private sector, to use a 
competitive process to select the source (includ-
ing directly outsourcing to the private sector)
•  A requirement for realistic and fair cost com-
parisons in all public/private competitions
• An allowance of administrative challenges to 
the list—by an interested party, an association 
representing private sector sources, an officer/
employee of an executive agency or a labor 
organization; challenges must be made within 
30 days after publication of the list
• An exemption for DoD depot maintenance 
activities
A pivotal milestone was the government’s FY 2000 
Inventory of Commercial Activities. This was the first 
year that OMB received an inventory from every 
agency of the total number of positions deemed com-
mercial in nature. In early 2001, OMB released a 
report that found that nearly half of civilian jobs, or 
approximately 850,000 positions, could be eligible 
for A-76 competitions because of their commercial 
designation. And this number was a minimum, since 
it excluded, for example, all DoD depot maintenance 
workers and all commercial jobs being filled by 
people in the military. This report formed the base-
line for each agency’s objective under the President’s 
Management Agenda’s major competitive sourcing 
initiative. 
The Bush Administration’s Competitive 
Sourcing Initiative
Shortly after assuming office, the George W. 
Bush administration developed its own strat-
egy for reforming the government and published 
the President’s Management Agenda (PMA). The 
President’s vision for government reform was guided 
by three principles. The administration stated that 
government should be: 
•  Citizen-centered, not bureaucracy-centered
•  Results-oriented
•  Market-based, actively promoting innovation 
through competition
One of the five government-wide initiatives con-
tained in the PMA to uphold these principles was  




the administration set the goal of competing 5 per-
cent of all federal jobs deemed commercial in 
nature in FY 2002, and that number increased by 
10 percent in FY 2003. Additionally, OMB identi-
fied a goal of competing 50 percent of the jobs 
identified as commercial for agencies to achieve  
a green score for competitive sourcing on their bal-
anced scorecard—this totaled 226,000 jobs for 
DoD. The “50 percent” goal came under fire as an 
“arbitrary numerical goal” from the Commercial 
Activities Panel, a panel of stakeholders and experts 
convened by Congress to improve the competitive 
sourcing process. Additionally, a RAND briefing  
recommended more strategic targets for competi-
tion.18 After resistance from agencies and Congress 
escalated, the administration eventually backed off 
from its government-wide targets for competition, 
and OMB decided in 2003 to set individual targets 
tailored to each agency.19 
While agencies are now given more flexibility in 
carrying out the competitive sourcing initiative, 
questions remain as to whether the administration 
has provided agencies with enough resources to 
execute the competitions—so as to learn the lessons 
from the Clinton-era downsizing that reduced posi-
tions without strategic consideration for the agency’s 
mission. A recent GAO report cited challenges 
facing agencies without adequate staff that pos-
sess the skills and ability to run these competitions 
effectively.20 The report noted that agencies have 
focused primarily on the number of positions being 
competed, based on the original recommendation 
by OMB, rather than on achieving higher levels of 
performance and efficiency. GAO recommended 
that OMB ensure that agencies have both adequate 
resources to run these competitions, as well as guid-
ance in conducting more strategic competitions that 
achieve performance and efficiency outcomes. 
The GAO report also noted, however, that despite 
these challenges all the agencies reviewed had laid 
the foundation for competitive sourcing. Several 
agencies had developed strategic and transparent 
competitive sourcing approaches by integrating their 
strategic and human capital plans with their com-
petitive sourcing plans. These agencies are identify-
ing viable activities for competition using broader 
functional assessments and comprehensive analyses 
of factors that include potential savings, risks, cur-
rent levels of efficiency, market conditions, and 
current and projected workforce profiles. A recent 
OMB report on progress with the Bush administra-
tion competitive sourcing initiative also found that 
agencies are aligning their competitive sourcing 
plans with decisions on future human capital needs 
and changes.21 Agencies are considering how com-
petitions will affect performance through any result-
ing “attrition, retirements, recruitment or retention 
difficulties, or skill imbalances.”22
Revisions to Circular A-76
In addition to its major competitive sourcing initia-
tive, the Bush administration sought to improve 
the process through revisions to Circular A-76 
announced in May 2003. There are several changes 
in the new A-76 that impact federal employees. 
First, agencies are required to finish competitions 
in 12 months (there is a provision for a six-month 
extension), but they are encouraged to do more 
preparatory work in the months leading up to the 
announcement, allowing the competitions to pro-
ceed more smoothly than they have in the past. 
Prior to this revision, the competitions commonly 
dragged on for years. The shortening of the compe-
tition cycle was designed in part to protect employ-
ees from the conflict and lower morale that result 
when competitions are announced without ade-
quate prior planning, which creates an extended 
period of uncertainty. 
Second, in-house employees are allowed to appeal 
the competition decision by electing a representa-
tive for an internal agency protest. If the employees 
are not satisfied with the internal agency appeal, 
they are allowed to appeal to the GAO. Employees 
are also able to challenge the designation of federal 
jobs as “commercial,” although these challenges are 
restricted to only those work designations changed 
from the previous year.23
Third, the revised A-76 increases the emphasis on 
improving performance, not only reducing cost. 
The revision allows agencies to use the “best value” 
method of determining the winner of identified types 
of competitions. OMB will pilot this new process on 
information technology (IT) jobs, because accord-
ing to the agency, value should be considered when 
making IT purchases, not simply low cost. In addi-
tion, OMB will allow agencies to use the best value 
process in other areas when agencies request it.24 
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Fourth, the revised A-76 gives the in-house bid a  
10 percent cost advantage in the evaluation. There 
is also a provision for streamlined competitions that 
involve 65 or fewer employees. This is an abbrevi-
ated process that does not involve the solicitation of 
full proposals; for these the government bidder does 
not receive the cost advantage. However, recent 
history shows that 89 percent of the competitions 
(including streamlined) are won by the in-house 
proposal.25 At the same time, the new Circular A-76 
eliminated the provision for the direct conversion 
of in-house employment to the private sector (these 
were previously limited to competitions with 10 or 
fewer employees).
Personnel Policies That Affect 
Competitive Sourcing
In addition to introducing initiatives for downsiz-
ing and competitive sourcing, both the Clinton and 
Bush administrations have taken steps to ensure that 
there are policies in place to protect federal employ-
ees affected by such initiatives. This section out-
lines those provisions, which include the rights of 
employees during and after competitions, as well as 
services provided to them once they are separated. 
Reduction in Force (RIF) Policies
The prospect of being laid off is one of the most 
difficult situations a federal employee could face 
during his or her career. The stress of facing the 
unknown, along with the prospect of being unem-
ployed, can be agonizing.
In the federal government, layoffs or involuntary 
separations are known as reductions in force, or 
RIFs. OPM has developed policies for employees 
impacted by a RIF. OPM emphasizes that RIFs are to 
be used as a last resort and that there are four con-
siderations in deciding whom to release:
•  Tenure of employment
•  Veterans’ preference
• Length of service
•  Performance ratings
So, while “RIF” certainly has negative connotations, 
it also has another side—regulations and proce-
dures that are used to determine objectively which 
employees will be separated, outline the employee’s 
rights to displace an employee in a lower tenure 
group, and delineate the employee’s appeal process. 
Once employees are released, they have rights to 
regain their federal employment. For one, they can 
use “bumping” to displace another employee out of 
his or her position who is in the same competitive 
area and either has a lower tenure or is in the same 
tenure group but is in a lower subgroup in the com-
petitive area. In addition, they can use “retreating” 
to displace another employee out of his or her posi-
tion who is in the same competitive area, tenure, 
and subgroup, but who has a shorter service record.
Employees who are involuntarily separated also 
have the right to appeal the decision if they feel 
their agency did not properly follow RIF proce-
dures. They are first given at least a 60-day writ-
ten notice of their termination, or if 50 or more 
employees are affected, they are given at least a 
120-day written notice. Once the RIF occurs, the 
employee can file an appeal after 30 days with 
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). RIFed 
employees are eligible to receive severance pay of 
one week’s salary for every year of employment. 
There is evidence that the RIF procedures have 
been correctly implemented for the most part. 
Between FY 1994 and FY 1996, when 31,545 posi-
tions were reduced, 402 grievances were filed with 
the MSPB, a rate of only 1.2 percent.26 
When an agency is considering what OPM deems 
to be “major” downsizing plans, OPM can grant 
the agency Voluntary Early Retirement Authority 
(VERA), or the ability to offer employees a choice 
to retire early, minimizing the number of employees 
who are involuntarily separated. For A-76 competi-
tions, agencies have the option of requesting that an 
organizational unit, rather than the whole agency, 
be considered eligible for VERA. OPM will then 
consider the request and grant VERA if the unit is 
considered to be undergoing major reorganization, 
a major RIF, or a major transfer of function (where 
a significant percentage of the workforce is sub-
ject to a separation or downgrade). Once granted 
VERA, the agency has the option to offer retirement 
incentives to those affected by a RIF, and the age 
and years of service required for an employee to be 
eligible to retire are reduced. OPM recommends 




deciding how to proceed with the early retirement 
incentives, the agency should ensure that it can 
continue to fulfill its mission.
Another tool an agency can employ to minimize 
involuntary separations is the employee buyout. 
If authorized by law, the agency can offer incen-
tive money for an employee to separate, which is 
equal to the lesser of the severance pay calculation, 
$25,000, or an amount determined by the head of 
the agency. Buyouts are subject to restrictions based 
on the employee, as well as on the agency. For 
instance, an agency growing in employees cannot 
offer buyouts. Similar to the early retirement incen-
tives, the agency is not obligated to offer the buyout 
incentive, nor is the employee entitled to one. 
Minimum Wage Laws for Contract Employees
There are two minimum wage laws that cover 
employees of federal contractors, serving not only 
to protect those employees but also to protect fed-
eral employees competing with the private sector. 
According to the Service Contract Act, employ-
ers with a government contract worth more than 
$2,500, and with a workforce considered to be 
service-based (IT, accounting, etc.), must pay wages 
that meet the prevailing wage rates and benefits of 
the specific locality. The Service Contract Act also 
specifies that if the previous contractor was cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement, then the 
current contractor must provide the wages and pro-
spective increases specified in the contract. 
According to the Davis-Bacon Act, all employers 
with government contracts exceeding $2,000, with 
employees classified as laborers or mechanics, 
must pay wages and benefits that meet the prevail-
ing rate in the locality. Unlike the Service Contract 
Act, however, there is no provision for contractors 
to pay the wages of the predecessor’s collective 
bargaining agreement. 
The Department of Labor administers these laws 
and determines the prevailing wages and benefits 
of each locality. Both of these laws are limited 
in coverage; in 1999, only 32 percent of federal 
contract workers were covered by prevailing wage 
laws.27 Both laws fail to completely level the play-
ing field between in-house and contractor bids, as 
the Federal Wage System (FWS) wage rates tend to 
exceed the prevailing wage laws.28 In addition, con-
cerns were raised in congressional testimony that 
the Department of Labor has failed to incorporate 
recent increases in the cost of providing health-
care,29 which may also affect the ability of federal 
employees to compete with private sector bids.
DoD Revisions to Personnel Policy
In the fall of 2003, Congress voted to give Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the authority to sig-
nificantly restructure DoD’s personnel policies. 
The new system will have a greater link of pay to 
employee performance, expand the use of “pay 
banding,” and turn over many jobs now performed 
by uniformed military members to civilian person-
nel. While DoD has not yet settled on the details 
of its new policies, it is fair to speculate that the 
changes will impact employees in positions being 
considered for competitive sourcing. Since the 
order of involuntary separations are currently based 
on General Schedule (GS) level, as are the rights of 
an employee to “bump” a lower tenured employee 
from his or her position, it is not clear how the 
new pay system will affect the rights of employees 
impacted by competitions. Federal employees have 
also expressed concerns about DoD plans to elimi-
nate preference for veterans who are being con-
sidered for involuntary separations.30 Additionally, 
because DoD was given the authority to loosen 
collective bargaining rules, employees undergoing 
competitive sourcing may lose some of their cur-
rent protections specified in union contracts, such 
as grievance procedures for those who have been 
involuntarily separated.
Previous Research on the Impact  
of Competitive Sourcing on Federal 
Employees
Studies on the impact of competitive sourcing on 
federal employees have been limited in number 
and scope. Many previous studies have examined 
the impact of competitive sourcing on employ-
ees through specific case studies, which do not 
allow one to generalize the results to the larger 
federal workforce. This section will utilize existing 
research to provide an overview of how competi-
tive sourcing has affected the employment, wages, 
benefits, and morale of federal employees.
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Impact on Employment, Wages, and Benefits
Researchers with RAND completed a study in 
2000 that examined six A-76 competitions held 
by DoD, including three that remained in-house 
and three that were won by the contractor.31 This 
study did not focus on methods used to reduce 
the workforce but rather on the level and source 
of savings. RAND found that the projected 
annual personnel cost savings of the competi-
tions, in the range of 34 to 59 percent of base-
line costs, was primarily derived from reduced 
personnel and downgraded positions. There were 
five methods through which these savings were 
projected by both in-house and contractor bids: 
•  Military-to-civilian conversion
•  Multi-skilling
•  Organizational restructuring
•  Reduced work scope
•  Increased labor availability (for contractors 
only)
Under military-to-civilian conversion, military posi-
tions are replaced with fewer civilians, whose work 
tenure is more predictable with fewer interruptions 
than military personnel. The second method, multi-
skilling, requires training personnel to be more gen-
eralized and less specialized, so fewer employees 
are required to perform a wider range of tasks. The 
third method, organizational restructuring, entails 
the consolidation of separate functions, which 
enables the bidder to reduce mid-level managers 
who are no longer needed to oversee one particu-
lar function.
The fourth method of achieving estimated cost sav-
ings, reduced work scope, either was explicitly 
written into the bid (it may have been the first time 
customers were confronted with a cost and quality 
tradeoff) or was implicit (requirements in the PWS 
were unintentionally reduced). The fifth method, 
increased labor availability, was used by contrac-
tors, as they are not constrained by more strict 
federal personnel policies. Contractors predicted an 
increase in the amount and intensity of work that 
employees will perform due to the lesser amounts 
of sick and leave time offered to employees. The 
contractors also predicted that employees would 
work harder given the fact that they are “at will” 
and thus can be fired without demonstrating “just 
cause” (unlike under federal personnel policy). 
In addition to reducing personnel in order to lower 
the bid, both the in-house and contractor bids 
downgraded positions. While employees do not 
always receive an immediate wage decrease from a 
downgrade, their prospective wages will either be 
decreased or fail to increase as high under the new 
lower grade. Only one bidder out of the six studied 
used immediate wage cuts to achieve estimated 
cost savings. In addition, only one bidder increased 
capital equipment to replace labor in order to 
achieve cost savings. Thus the most frequently 
employed methods of achieving significant savings 
in projected costs were to reduce personnel and 
downgrade positions. These methods reflect previ-
ous findings of the GAO that A-76 competitions 
primarily achieve savings by reducing the number 
of personnel required, regardless of whether the bid 
was won by the in-house or contracting function.32
A second report on the effects of competitive 
sourcing on federal employees, issued by the GAO, 
studied three competitions held by DoD: two 
where the contractor was selected and one where 
the in-house bidder won.33 In reviewing these 
three studies, the report found that of the 1,111 
civilian positions studied, only 61, or 5.5 percent, 
were involuntarily separated. Of the 750 positions 
reduced, 5 percent of the employees were volun-
tarily separated, 8 percent were involuntarily sepa-
rated, 27 percent transferred to another government 
job, and 61 percent retired. (Note: The numbers do 
not add up, as the GAO report included other base 
employees affected by the reduction in force.) For 
the two studies where the contractor won, 25 per-
cent of employees who left the government—either 
through retirement or separation—went to work for 
the contractor. In the study where the in-house bid 
won, a little over half of the federal employees who 
remained had their positions downgraded, while 
only 1 percent received a higher grade. However, 
these downgrades rarely resulted in any change in 
pay or benefits to those employees affected.  
In the two studies where the contractor won, both 
contractors hired all the federal employees who 
applied, allowing some employees to earn higher 
wages while some earned lower wages. The report 




were similar to those provided by the federal gov-
ernment—in terms of health insurance, vacation 
time, and other benefits. According to the contrac-
tors, hiring the federal employees enabled them to 
hire an experienced workforce without having to 
pay for training. 
While the RAND and GAO studies explicitly 
focused on the impact of competitive sourcing on 
employees, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
performed a similar study, focusing instead on the 
effects of outsourcing on DoD employees.34 The 
study found that DoD personnel programs were 
successful in minimizing the number of employees 
who were involuntarily separated. Depot facilities 
targeted 40 percent of their employees for a reduc-
tion in force, but only 3.4 percent were involuntarily 
separated, as many employees found other DoD 
jobs through that department’s job placement ser-
vice, some voluntarily separated to take jobs with 
the winning contractor, and others retired. 
Employee Morale 
If you read the newspapers and periodicals that 
cover federal employment issues, it is hard to miss 
stories about federal jobs being considered for 
competitions, jobs lost to contractor bids, and jobs 
won by in-house bids. There is a palpable anxiety 
among federal workers quoted in these stories, 
and among those who testify before Congress, 
over the possibility of losing their status as federal 
employees. As Figure 1 shows, employee benefits 
and job security are most important to federal 
employees. The uncertainty that competitive sourc-
ing introduces, not unlike that faced by virtually all 
employees in the private sector, generates anxiety 
and the resultant employee resistance to the com-
petitive sourcing process. 
Whether or not these employee fears of competi-
tive sourcing are warranted, they do potentially 
affect the morale of the federal workforce. The 
recent OMB revisions to A-76 have addressed 
this concern by reducing the time period for the 
competitions, which should reduce the period of 
uncertainty. One indication that competitive sourc-
ing may not always lower employee morale comes 
from a recent survey. “Best Places to Work in the 
Federal Government” is a ranking of federal agen-
cies derived from a sample of federal employees. 
Out of 28 cabinet departments and independent 
Figure 1: Top 10 Reasons Federal Employees Plan to Stay on Their Jobs
Source: MSPB, Merit Principles Survey 2000, September 2003
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agencies, the Air Force ranked number seven, fol-
lowed closely by the Army, which ranked number 
10.35 Given that the Air Force and Army have 
conducted a large amount of competitive sourcing 
activity, holding 684 competitions between 1994 
and early 2004 and competing 60,381 jobs, they 
outranked many agencies that held no competi-
tions—apparently the morale of their employees 
has not suffered greatly from it.
Research Questions Pursued in  
This Study
As shown above, previous studies of the impacts of 
competitive sourcing have largely focused on case 
studies. Many of the perceptions of various stake-
holders have been formed by these case studies 
and other anecdotal stories. In contrast, this study, 
while limited to the Defense Department, covers 
more than 1,200 completed competitions over a 
10-year period. It attempts to address the following 
questions often raised by stakeholders:
•  Given the cost of conducting competitions—in 
dollars, time, and morale—are there significant 
gains in applying the process?
•  Are federal employees significantly adversely 
affected by competition, whether the in-house 
team or the contractor wins?
•  Are private contractors dominating the winning 
bids?
•  Since the Bush administration took office in 
2001 and increased the emphasis on competi-
tive sourcing, are there more competitions and 
more employees losing their jobs?
•  What strategies can be applied to ensure a 
“soft landing” for those federal civilian employ-





Analyzing DoD Competitive 
Sourcing: Reviewing 10 Years of Data
The following section summarizes the findings 
from an examination of CAMIS data, which track 
the results of A-76 competitions that took place in 
DoD beginning in 1994. Data from 1994 until the 
first quarter of 2004 were reviewed and analyzed. 
The data track the various stages of the almost 
1,200 competitions held, from the initial number 
of civilian and military positions studied to the 
final number of FTEs authorized in the winning bid 
(if it was a government win). Also included in the 
data is information on the baseline costs and esti-
mated savings by the government’s most efficient 
organization (MEO),36 as well as characteristics of 
the winning provider (public or private). In addi-
tion to the four military services, data are also col-
lected from the various defense agencies such as 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense 
Finance and Audit Agency (DFAS), and the Defense 
Commissary Agency (DeCA). 
For the purposes of this report, we have focused on 
the results of the competitions’ effects on employ-
ees. We included the initial number of positions 
studied, the final number of positions in the MEO, 
and the method used to reduce the civilian work-
force: voluntary separation (including retirements 
Size and Distribution of the DoD Workforce
DoD is the largest federal department by far, with a total of 653,932 civilian employees in December 2003— 
35 percent of the total federal workforce.37 In 2002, the DoD workforce was roughly two-thirds men, and the racial/
ethnic composition was 73 percent white, 14 percent black, 6 percent Hispanic, 6 percent Asian, and 1 percent 
American Indian. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of these employees: 
Table 1: Civilian Employment in DoD, December 2003 
Department U.S. Stateside U.S. Territories Foreign Country Unspecified Total
Air Force 143,880 661 3,471 2 148,014
Army 209,912 1,232 12,899 19 224,062
Navy 175,951 993 4,169 4 181,117
Other 84,162 1,584 14,952 41 100,739
Total 613,905 4,470 35,491 66 653,932
Source: FedScope, U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
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and transfers to other positions in the government) 
and involuntary separation of both temporary 
and regular employees. Military positions are also 
impacted, and when we use the term “total autho-
rizations,” the corresponding figure includes military 
positions serving in commercial functions. When a 
military position is eliminated by one of these com-
petitions, that position is generally returned to per-
form a noncommercial core mission. In addition, 
we have also compared the estimated savings and 
resulting reductions in force between the wins by 
the in-house workforce and those by a contractor. 
Given the immense size of DoD, the level of 
competition between its employees and the private 
sector has been extensive. Between 1994 and the 
beginning of 2004, over 1,200 competitions have 
been documented in the CAMIS database, with 
nearly 95,000 total authorizations (employee 
positions) reviewed for competition. Of these 
authorizations, over 68,000 are civilian posi-
tions, or approximately 11 percent of all DoD 
employees, and almost 25,000 are military posi-
tions. Table 2 summarizes the data set used for 
the following analysis.
Total FTEs Competed               
by Type  
(Military & Civilian)
Civilian FTEs Competed  
by Type




                 1,720 (2%)                   1,719 (3%)                     51 (4%)
Standard Cost 
Comparisons
               78,985 (83%)                 61,301 (90%)                   509 (42%)
Direct Conversions                13,826 (15%)                   5,239 (7%)                   660 (54%)
Total                94,531                 68,259                1,220
  
Table 2: Total DoD FTEs Competed from 1994 through the First Quarter of 2004
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The types of initiatives that occurred included 
standard cost comparisons, streamlined cost com-
parisons, and direct conversions. Standard cost 
comparisons involve a full competition between  
in-house and contract or ISSA bids for the most  
efficient organization. Streamlined cost compari-
sons allow an abbreviated procedure when com-
peting 65 or fewer employees; the in-house MEO 
bid is compared to existing contracts for similar 
work. Direct conversions, which are no longer 
authorized with the revised A-76 Circular, involve 
the movement of 10 or fewer government positions 
into the private sector without competition. 
The direct conversions make up the largest percentage 
of competitions held (54 percent) compared to stan-
dard cost comparisons (42 percent) and streamlined 
cost comparisons (4 percent). However, when exam-
ining the percentage of employees studied, standard 
cost comparisons competed far more FTEs (90 percent) 
than direct conversions (8 percent) and streamlined 
comparisons (2 percent). This indicates that the large 
number of direct conversions were each done for a 
small number of employees—an inefficient way of 
running competitions since it does not allow for any 
reengineering of the overall work process involved.38
Figure 2 depicts the trends in the number of compe-
titions held since CAMIS began collecting the data. 
The total number of annual competitions decided 
rose rapidly between 1996 and 2000, increasing 
from 14 to 214 in that period. Competitions peaked 
in 2000, leveling off to 162 held in 2003. The graph 
also illustrates trends in the winning bidders, includ-
ing the contractor bid, the in-house (or federal 
employee) bid, and an ISSA bid, one placed by a 
non-DoD federal agency on a reimbursable basis. 
Of the total number of competitions decided, con-
tractors won the vast majority of competitions until 
1999, when in-house bidders began winning more, 
and the split was around 60 percent private and 40 
percent public wins. By 2001 the public and private 
wins were split evenly, and by 2003, in-house bids 
won nearly twice as many competitions as contrac-
tors. Bids from an ISSA were rare, and ISSA bids 
won only six competitions between 1999 and 2002. 
Figure 3 shows the trends in the average numbers 
of total FTEs competed each year through 2003, the 
last year with complete data. The trend in the total 
number of FTEs resulting from the competitions fol-
lows the trend of the total number of competitions 
completed—with rapid growth of positions com-
peted in the mid to late 1990s and a slight drop-off 
in 2002 and 2003. 
Data in Table 3 on page 24 examine the competitions 
won by either the in-house MEO or private contrac-
tors. The MEO is the government reengineered orga-
nization developed to form the basis of the in-house 
proposal. The MEO bid illustrates how introducing 
competitive forces can drive gains in productivity and 
efficiency in government operations—even when the 
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MEO FTEs  
(Excluding Direct  
Conversions)
% Decrease from 
Civilian Authorizations  
to Government MEO 
FTEs
In-House 525 (44%) 41,793 23,253 44%
Contractor 667 (56%) 23,364 16,848 28%
Total 1,192 65,157 40,101
of the competitions, compared to 44 percent for the 
in-house bidders. The difference between the total 
civilian authorizations studied and the final average 
MEO FTEs39 was large. The agency MEOs where the 
in-house teams won showed a significantly larger 
reduction in civilian authorizations than the agency 
MEOs where the contractor won—44 percent com-
pared to 28 percent. We can only conclude that this 
was one of the factors that contributed to the in-house 
team losing those competitions. 
Table 4 includes information on the projected cost 
savings resulting from the competitions. The sum of 
the estimated savings resulting from the winning pro-
posal is compared to the initial baseline cost of the 
authorizations studied, resulting in the percentage of 
estimated savings. For all winning bids, estimated sav-
ings averaged 44 percent, for a total of $11.2 billion. 
Contractors had a higher estimated rate of savings  
(48 percent) than the in-house bidders (37 percent). 
In terms of the impact of these competitions on civil-
ian employees, there were five possible results docu-
mented in the data: retirement, transfer to another 
government position, involuntary separation of regu-
lar employees, involuntary separation of temporary 
employees, and unfilled authorizations eliminated. 
Of the 65,157 positions competed, a total of 24,852 
positions were reduced between 1995 and the begin-
ning of 2004 (see Figure 4). The majority of positions 
reduced from the initial civilian FTEs competed did 
not result in involuntary separations. Sixteen percent 
of the competed positions transferred to another 
government job, and 11 percent resulted in the retire-
ment of those employees. In comparison, the per-
centage of civilian FTEs competed that were reduced 
through involuntary separation was 5 percent for reg-
ular employees and 3 percent for temporary employ-
ees. There are no data on how many of the separated 
employees were subsequently hired by the contractor.
As Table 5 and Figure 5 (see page 26) indicate (and 
as would be expected), employees were affected 
differently by competitive sourcing, depending on 
whether the contractor or the in-house bidder won. 
In addition, this expected impact was amplified by 
the fact that the decrease in civilian FTEs competed 
was nearly double for the contractor wins than the 
in-house wins. Thus, the number of employees who 
retired was much greater under the contractor wins, 
In-House Win Contractor Win ISSA Total
Sum of Baseline 
Cost
$9,253,439,000 $15,340,483,000 $1,256,000 $25,848,092,000
Sum of Estimated 
Savings
$3,447,539,000 $7,287,840,000 $19,000 $11,237,126,000
% Estimated Savings 37% 48% 2% 44% (average)
Note: The CAMIS data included a number of unspecified competitions, shown here, whose baseline costs totaled $1,256,000. Savings 
resulting from the unspecified competitions totaled $19,000. These numbers are included in the “total” column. 
Table 4: DoD Estimated Cost Savings from Competitions, 1994 through Early 2004; Winning Contractor 




and larger as a percentage of positions reduced (35 
percent compared to 24 percent for in-house wins). 
And out of the total population that had a 5 percent 
overall involuntary reduction, the percentage of 
civilian FTEs reduced through the involuntary sepa-
ration of regular employees was also higher for com-
petitions when the contractor won, with 4 percent of 
civilian FTEs coming from contractor wins and only 
1 percent from in-house wins. Most of the civilians 
involuntarily separated were given severance pay. 
From 1994 to 2004, 2,252 employees were paid a 
total of over $116 million in severance pay, an aver-
age amount of almost $52,000 per person.

















In-House 647 1,893 5,128 339 839 8,846
Contract 2,680 5,373 5,845 1,475 633 16,006
ISSA 0 0 1 0 0 1
Total Positions 
Reduced
3,327 7,266 10,974 1,814 1,472 24,852
As % of 
Positions 
Reduced
13% 29% 44% 7% 6% 100%
As % of 
Civilian FTEs 
Competed
5% 11% 16% 3% 2% 38%
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As Figure 6 indicates, the numbers of civilian FTEs 
competed that were involuntarily separated have 
remained low over the years. From year to year, the 
ratio between positions reduced through involuntary 
and voluntary separation remained similar. The larg-
est number of involuntary separations occurred in 
2000, when 1,152 non-temporary employees were 
released. From that peak, the numbers have been 
trending downward at a greater rate than the num-
bers of civilian FTEs competed. 
Figure 7 indicates an overall downward trend in 
the percentage of civilian positions competed that 
resulted in involuntary separations between 1996 
and 2003. The initial spike in the percentage sepa-
rated between 1995 and 1996 is an outlier—based 
more on the small number of positions competed 
than a sustainable trend. The trend between 1997 
and 2003—with the exception of 2000—indicates 
that the percentage of involuntary separations is not 
likely to rise much above 5 percent. 
Analysis of Results
There are several conclusions that can be drawn 
from the CAMIS data. First, DoD is clearly committed 
to the competitive sourcing practice, as the annual 
number of competitions increased from seven in 
1995 to 162 in 2003, and it averaged 190 per year 
between 1999 and 2003. These competitions widely 
range in the total number of personnel positions 
studied, with a high of 1,800 and a low of one; 
when discounting direct conversions, which involve 
a small number of employees, the number of total 
positions averaged 144 per competition. 
Contractors won 56 percent of the competitions, 
compared to 44 percent for the in-house bid. 
However, when the direct conversions are excluded, 
contractors won 32 percent compared to 68 percent 
for the in-house bidder (both figures exclude win-
ning ISSA bids and initiatives where the winner was 
not indicated in the CAMIS data). When you look at 
the data year to year (see Figure 2 on page 22), how-
ever, in 2001 there was a crossover with in-house wins 
approximately double the contractor wins. This is a 
critical element in this discussion, since in-house wins 
result in much lower rates of involuntary separation. It 
will be interesting to see whether the trend continues. 
In comparing the estimated cost savings between the 
bids, contractors project a savings rate of 48 percent 
of the baseline, compared to 37 percent savings in the 
in-house bid. The contractors’ average savings exceeds 
that of in-house bidders, and that is likely the result 
of various factors; however, the data do not provide 
enough insight to draw any conclusions. 
Overall, in terms of the impact of the competitions 

















Figure 5: DoD Positions Reduced by Winning Bid; More Separations Occur When Contractor Wins Bid 




reduced per competition and fewer than four invol-
untary separations per competition. Of the initial 
civilian FTEs competed, only 5 percent were 
reduced through the involuntary separation of regu-
lar employees and 3 percent reduced through the 
termination of temporary employees. If this experi-
ence at DoD can be generalized to the larger fed-
eral workforce, the involuntary separations resulting 
from competitive sourcing are quite small as a per-
centage of overall employment. The more than 
3,300 involuntary separations that occurred between 
1995 and early 2004 constitute a minor percentage 
of the DoD civilian workforce. An average of 587 
involuntary separations, resulting from competitive 
sourcing, occurred annually between 1999 and 
2004, accounting for only .09 percent of the total 
civilian workforce of DoD in 2003.  



















Figure 7: DoD Civilian FTEs Involuntarily Separated Due to Competition; Sharp Drop in Separations Due 
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Though the number of civilians who were invol-
untarily separated is fairly small, the total number 
of positions reduced, 24,852, is significant, and it 
is largely the result of increased efficiency and the 
source of the estimated savings. And while over 
7,000 civilians have retired between 1995 and early 
2004 in conjunction with the competitions, no data 
are collected to see how many of those retirees sub-
sequently took jobs with the winning contractors. 
In many cases these individuals are the recipients 
of early retirement incentives and retirement annui-
ties. These retirees transfer into jobs at comparable 
pay and benefits, and the government continues to 
take advantage of their expertise. Some have argued 
that the reductions in the workforce would place an 
unnecessary burden on the remaining workers, but 
the general performance improvements achieved 
demonstrate otherwise.40 
While the data provide a general overview of the 
nature of A-76 competitions in DoD, there may 
be limitations to this data. Site visits performed 
by RAND in conjunction with an earlier survey 
(1978–1994) noted that the impact on employees 
may be understated by DoD’s data; civilian person-
nel offices would hire temporary employees to fill 
slots in organizations scheduled for competitions 
or fail to fill vacancies. In addition, the data do not 
capture the secondary impact of competitions when 
federal employees scheduled for RIFs opt to exercise 
their rights of “bumping” or “retreating” lower ten-
ured employees out of their jobs. Thus, some claim 
the number of employees indirectly impacted—not 
separated but reassigned to different jobs—may be 
as high as four or five times the number of employ-
ees separated.41 
In contrast, although no CAMIS data are available, 
anecdotal data would indicate that some employ-
ees chose to be involuntarily separated in order to 
receive the benefits and then take jobs with the win-
ning contractor. The RAND study does show that 26 
percent of the employees who retired or separated 
voluntarily took jobs with the winning contractor, 
and as illustrated later in the privatization case, 
virtually all the RIFed employees took jobs with 
the new company. So some of those categorized as 
“involuntarily separated” may have chosen to leave 
under this category rather than leave voluntarily 
(since the benefits are better). 
While the RAND study suggests that some employ-
ees chose to be involuntarily separated, this has not 
been commonplace. The number of full-time civil-
ian employees who were involuntarily separated as 
a result of competitive sourcing—5 percent of the 
total number of positions competed—is relatively 




While DoD’s data indicate that the number of 
employees involuntarily separated from competi-
tive sourcing is low, it is still important for govern-
ment agencies to provide these employees with the 
resources necessary to transition to other employ-
ment. There are several “soft-landing” programs 
offered by the federal government that provide 
career assistance to RIFed employees. The Career 
Transition Assistance Program (CTAP) is one such 
soft-landing program. OPM directives require every 
agency to establish its own CTAP program. The 
CTAP programs offer services to affected employ-
ees such as career counseling, resume preparation, 
retraining, and other forms of assistance. In addi-
tion, employees are given excused absences to use 
these services and are provided access to the ser-
vices after they have been separated. 
One element within the CTAP is the Reemployment 
Priority List (RPL), which gives employees affected 
by RIFs priority when applying for a job with a 
federal agency. The RPL applicant is given priority 
over certain outside applicants, and an agency can 
also choose to prioritize the employee over inter-
nal applicants. Each agency is required to main-
tain an RPL list and to add employees who have 
gone through a RIF. (If an agency runs a separate 
placement program for employees, such as DoD’s 
Priority Placement Program, it is not required to 
maintain an RPL.) For RPL rehire processes, an 
employee has the right to appeal to the MSPB if he 
feels his reemployment rights were violated. 
In addition to receiving priority rehire from the 
agency that separated them through the RPL, employ-
ees are given priority rehire by outside agencies 
through the Interagency Career Transition Assistance 
Plan (ICTAP). Between the fiscal years 1996 and 
2000, 2,413 RIFed employees were rehired through 
the RPLs—nearly 10 percent of all RIFs that occurred 
during those years.42 And between fiscal years 1996 
and 2000, 1,300 were rehired through ICTAP—
roughly 5 percent of all RIFs during that period.
Another soft-landing program available to 
employees who are involuntarily separated is the 
Department of Labor’s Rapid Response Services, 
which operates in areas where major layoffs have 
occurred—in both the private and public sectors. 
Rapid response teams are designed to help manag-
ers and employees cope with situations in which 
more than 50 employees are laid off. The State 
Dislocated Worker Units send representatives to the 
actual employment site, where the rapid response 
teams provide services such as career counseling, 
assistance with job searches, and information and 
financial support for job training. In addition, the 
affected employees have access to computers, fax 
machines, and telephones to aid with job searches. 
While these soft-landing tools provided by the fed-
eral government help RIFed employees find new 
jobs, more significant support can be provided to 
employees in the form of contractual obligations 
negotiated during a competition. These contractual 
obligations, required of the contractor that wins the 
bid, have included provisions such as:
• The contractor must hire all the federal 
employees who apply, at the same pay,         
for a certain number of years. 




IBM Center for The Business of Government
• Federal employees receive right-of-first-refusal 
for employment with the contractor.
• Federal employees are paid bonuses, health-
care, and retirement upon displacement.
While these are the formal programs, creative 
managers and stakeholders outside the government 
have found other ways to soften the transitions for 
employees. The following four examples illustrate 
some of the techniques used.
Privatization in Place: An 
Alternative to Reductions in Force 
at the Naval Air Warfare Center, 
Aircraft Division, Indianapolis43
In 1995, the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 
Division, in Indianapolis, Indiana, (NAWC-ADI) 
was placed on the 1995 Base Realignment and 
Closure list. The official mission of NAWC-ADI was 
to “… conduct research, development, engineering, 
material acquisition, pilot and limited manufactur-
ing, technical evaluation, depot maintenance, and 
integrated logistics support on assigned airborne 
electronics (avionics), missile, space borne, undersea, 
and surface weapon systems, and related equipment.” 
In 1995, the center provided a significant economic 
benefit to the city of Indianapolis and central Indiana 
by employing approximately 2,500 people, with over 
50 percent of the workforce made up of highly skilled 
engineering and technical professionals. The average 
salary at the center exceeded $45,000, making it one 
of the highest paying employers in the Indianapolis 
area. City officials were thus extremely concerned that 
the loss of NAWC-ADI jobs would have a major eco-
nomic impact on the city. 
Typically, base closures result in the relocation of 
required personnel and equipment to other bases, 
which was what the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission originally recommended for NAWC-
ADI. Instead of fighting the closure, however, the 
mayor of Indianapolis proposed a highly creative 
alternative—privatization. City officials opined 
that this strategy would meet DoD infrastructure 
reduction goals, greatly reduce costs and service 
disruptions associated with closures, create savings, 
and facilitate the retention of technical capabilities 
needed to support DoD missions. The commission 
agreed with the city’s assessment and revised its 
closure recommendation to include the privatiza-
tion alternative. The Navy agreed to evaluate this 
alternative strategy; however, it stated that it would 
only support privatization if it were “… cost effec-
tive, provided responsive service to Navy needs, 
and satisfied a number of other concerns.” In the 
end, after an industrial competition, the facility was 
privatized and over 2,000 employees were inter-
viewed. Virtually all were hired (less than 1 percent 
were not hired) at equivalent pay and benefits 
by the company that took over base operations. 
Privatization-in-place (if the winning contractor  
can bring in additional work) thus offers a potential 
way to avoid major reductions in force, allowing 
employees the opportunity to remain in their posi-
tions, with current salary and benefits, but to work 
for a private employer rather than the government. 
Outsourcing with Zero Employee 
Displacement: NASA’s Outsourcing 
Desktop Initiative Program44
In 1996, NASA approved the Outsourcing Desktop 
Initiative (ODIN) program, a “long-term outsourc-
ing arrangement with the commercial sector which 
transfers to it the responsibility and risk for pro-
viding and managing the vast majority of NASA’s 
desktop, server, and intra-center communication 
assets and services as the Agency downsizes and 
refocuses IT personnel to Agency core missions.”45 
Through ODIN, NASA officials hoped to cut desk-
top computing costs, significantly increase service 
quality, achieve interoperability and standardiza-
tion among NASA computer operations, and allow 
NASA employees to focus on their core responsibil-
ities. Under the outsourcing arrangement, none of 
the contractors would be guaranteed sales, so each 
contractor would have to compete with all the 
other eligible vendors. Each NASA center would 
select one of the contractors as its exclusive desk-
top services provider for three years.46
One concern that existed among the employees and 
managers of both the government and contractors 
prior to ODIN’s launch was the likelihood of invol-
untary displacement of employees. This was consis-
tent with one of the most prevalent myths connected 
with introducing competition into the government. 
However, in reality, one of the objectives of the 
ODIN program was to shift government IT person-




a result, ODIN caused zero involuntary personnel 
displacements. Overall, the ODIN program mini-
mized the negative impact on employees while 
refocusing government personnel on core research 
and development activities. Since ODIN began, 
NASA managers have seen an increase in mission 
support and productivity as well as improvements 
in service delivery and service consistency. Rather 
than reducing its workforce when it outsourced 
IT support, NASA chose to reassign employees 
from support to core mission functions within the 
agency. In the end, NASA was able to more effec-
tively provide IT support across the agency while 
improving its core mission performance. 
“Soft-Landing” Packages That Lessen 
the Impact of Outsourcing: The 
Army’s Logistics Modernization 
Program47 
The first Gulf War revealed fundamental weak-
nesses in the Army’s vast and complex logistics 
network. Recognizing the need to adopt the best 
practices of private sector supply chain manage-
ment, DoD and Army leaders began strategic 
planning efforts directed toward logistics reform. 
Principal targets for reform were the Army’s 30-
year-old logistics information management sys-
tems. Written in COBOL, these systems were 
outmoded, inflexible, expensive, and difficult to 
maintain. Further, the Army was finding it increas-
ingly difficult to find qualified replacements for 
the aging and rapidly retiring workers who were 
trained to run this system. In August of 1997, the 
Army’s Communications and Electronics Command 
(CECOM) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey—the 
organization responsible for these antiquated sys-
tems—received direction “to explore alternatives 
to modernize the wholesale logistics processes and 
associated information technology.” CECOM was 
also directed to consider the implications on the 
existing workforce of 478 employees. 
During the following two years, a dedicated 
Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) team 
accomplished detailed analysis, planning, and 
coordination that culminated in the award of a 
performance-based contract that outsourced Army 
logistics functions to a private firm, Computer 
Sciences Corporation (CSC). CSC was chosen,  
in part, because of its performance and its  
soft-landing plan, which guaranteed every 
employee a three-year job in the same geographic 
location, with comparable pay and benefits, and 
a $15,000 sign-on bonus with the first CSC pay-
check. In the end, job offers were extended to all 
remaining 207 employees, with 205 accepting.48 
Most Central Design Activity employees were 
participants in the legacy Civil Service Retirement 
System, and 83 percent were eligible for regu-
lar or early retirement within five years of 1999. 
Consequently, many employees chose to transfer to 
other federal positions or accept buyouts and early 
retirement packages offered by the Army.49 Thus by 
negotiating soft landings for employees, including 
job offers, bonuses, and early retirement benefits, 
the LMP team minimized the negative impact of 
outsourcing on employees.
Best Practice for Competitive 
Sourcing Implementation: 
Department of the Interior’s 
National Park Service 
A recently completed cost comparison as part of a 
competitive sourcing study determined that federal 
workers at the National Park Service’s Southeast 
Archeological Center could perform the center’s 
mission more economically than contracting with 
private firms. The Park Service’s competitive sourc-
ing team at the Southeast Archeological Center in 
Tallahassee, Florida, conducted a competition using 
the A-76 streamlined competition rules, developed 
by the Department of the Interior and adopted by 
OMB for inclusion in the revised Circular A-76. The 
in-house team, composed of 45 archeologists at the 
center, reorganized itself into an MEO, eliminated 
17 FTE positions, and won the competition. After 
comparing personnel costs, material and supply 
costs, overhead costs, and other costs of in-house 
performance to the cost of private sector perfor-
mance, the agency’s contracting officer determined 
that the MEO represented the more cost-effective 
option. The elimination trimmed $850,000 per 
year in annual personnel costs. Over the next five 
years, the Park Service will save $4.2 million as a 
result of this competition—and in accordance with 
the revised A-76, it will track actual savings to 
ensure that benefits are realized. Importantly, as a 
result of this competition, through detailed person-
nel planning, not one permanent employee lost his 
or her job.50 
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Findings
Finding 1: Competition results in savings.  
The benefits of improved performance and cost 
savings from competitive sourcing are significant, 
affirming previous research findings. As demon-
strated by the CAMIS data, competitions resulted 
in an average estimated savings of 44 percent of 
baseline costs, for a total of $11.2 billion. Much of 
this savings was derived from reducing the work-
force—of the 65,157 full-time positions competed 
between 1995 and 2004, a total of 24,852 posi-
tions were reduced.
Finding 2: Involuntary separations are few.
The DoD data provide insight into the effects of 
competitive sourcing on the employment of fed-
eral workers, and demonstrate that in addition to 
achieving significant savings, DoD was able to 
minimize the negative impacts on employees—i.e., 
there has not been a large number of involuntary 
separations. As one would expect, however, the 
major organizational restructuring, whether the 
contractor or the in-house team wins, causes some 
disruption. Thus, it is important to consider the best 
process of executing these competitions without 
imposing undue harm on federal employees. 
Finding 3: MEOs are winning most of the 
competitions.
While in-house bids have won 44 percent of com-
petitions held since 1994, compared to 56 percent 
for contractors, in-house bids have improved their 
win rate since 1999. By 2001, public and private 
wins were split evenly, and by 2003, in-house 
bids won nearly twice as many competitions as 
contractors. This trend could reduce the number 
of involuntary separations, as they were less likely 




• The cost of government services will be higher. 
•  Large numbers of government employees will  
be involuntarily separated. 
•  Contractors have a significant advantage  
in competitions. 
Study Findings
•  Competitions resulted in an average estimated 
savings of 44 percent of baseline costs (with either 
improved performance or no decrease).
•  Only an average of 5 percent of DoD jobs com-
peted resulted in involuntary separation.
•  Since 1999, in-house bids have increased their 
win rate and, by 2003, won nearly twice as many 
competitions as contractors.






Recommendation 1: Agency managers should con-
tinue pursuing competitive sourcing; the perfor-
mance gains and cost savings, along with the small 
number of involuntary separations of government 
employees, clearly warrant it. 
The benefits, in terms of improved performance 
at significant cost savings—on average 44 per-
cent—warrant continuation. The cost in terms of 
negative impacts to employees is manageable and 
should not be used as a reason to forgo competitive 
sourcing initiatives. On average, a small percent-
age of the positions competed were involuntarily 
separated (average of around 5 percent, with typi-
cal numbers in the 3 percent to 8 percent range), 
and based on the trends with the in-house teams 
winning more of the competitions, that rate should 
decrease still further. In addition, claims of low 
employee morale due to competitive sourcing do 
not seem to be supported by available data. The 
Air Force and Army, both agencies practicing a 
large amount of competitive sourcing, were highly 
ranked by their employees in a list of best places 
to work in the federal government. Thus managers 
must assess the evidence in deciding on the merits 
of competitive sourcing. 
Recommendation 2: Senior agency leadership, 
when planning for competitive sourcing competi-
tions, should ensure that minimizing the potential 
impact on employees is identified as a high priority. 
When managers prioritize the impact of competi-
tive sourcing on employees and proper planning 
occurs before the competitions take place, the neg-
ative impact of competitive sourcing on employees 
can be minimized. NASA demonstrated that, by 
thinking strategically about its human resources, 
it could implement an effective outsourcing plan 
without any reductions in force. The agency was 
able to reassign affected employees to more core-
level tasks, avoiding involuntary separations and 
improving performance. When the reduction of 
positions is inevitable, managers are provided with 
many incentives to encourage employees to volun-
tarily separate. With advanced planning, agencies 
can offer employees buyout plans, early retirement, 
and transfers to other government positions, avoid-
ing involuntary separations. 
Recommendation 3: Agency leaders and managers 
should know and use all the available tools, alter-
natives, and techniques to minimize any negative 
impact on separating employees. 
Any initiative that results in employee displacement 
presents a management challenge to agency manag-
ers and leaders. Over the past 15 years (since the 
end of the Cold War), DoD has undergone a signifi-
cant reduction in its civilian workforce—down 36 
percent since 1988, a reduction of almost 380,000 
people. Although most of these reductions were 
outside the context of competitive sourcing, DoD, 
as well as other agencies, has gained a large body 
of experience on restructuring organizations and 
separating personnel. OPM should sponsor the col-
lection and analysis of this data; use this analysis for 
the development of lessons learned, best practices, 
and training materials; and make those available to 
agencies so that they can train leaders and manag-
ers. Leaders and managers must be knowledgeable 
of all tools, alternatives, and techniques available 
to them as they develop their sourcing strategies, 
selecting those that minimize any adverse impact  
to employees.
Recommendation 4: Managers can and should look 
at innovative ways to offer employees a smooth 
transition in the event of involuntary separation. 
Many options exist for managers to provide a soft 
landing to displaced employees. While the federal 
government offers RIFed employees options such as 
priority rehire or career counseling, agency manag-
ers can expand these transitional benefits during 
the competitive bidding process. The example of 
CECOM demonstrates that when managers integrate 
plans to lessen the blow of outsourcing on employ-
ees with their plans to choose a high-performing 
contractor, employees benefit with contractual soft-
landing provisions. In deciding on a bidder, manag-
ers can insist that contractors provide benefits to 
federal employees in the form of bonuses, compa-
rable pay and benefits, and job offers. 
Recommendation 5: Agency leaders and managers 
should continually communicate with both employ-
ees and external stakeholders.  
Perhaps the most important element of the competi-
tive sourcing process, like any major staff reengi-
neering initiative, is for the senior leadership and 
managers to maintain open lines of communica-
tion with their employees and other stakeholders. 
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The Commercial Activities Panel heard complaints 
from federal employees that the A-76 process was 
not “clear, transparent, and consistently applied.”51 
During the downsizing initiative of the Clinton 
administration, OPM noted that low morale of 
employees was often the result of a lack of commu-
nication between those making the decisions and 
the employees affected by them.52 There is a clear 
need for extensive communication during the com-
petition so that the process is transparent and all 
stakeholders—especially employees—understand 
how and why decisions are made. This should 
result in less overall resistance to the competitive 
sourcing process. 
Conclusion 
Because the opposition to competitive sourcing 
primarily derives from those who want to protect 
federal jobs, the ability to understand clearly how 
the process affects employees is crucial to defend-
ing the practice of competitive sourcing. This report 
has aimed to add a more quantitative dimension to 
the discussion of how competitive sourcing affects 
federal employees. To date, there has been a lim-
ited amount of research on the topic. The analysis 
of the CAMIS data contributes to an understand-
ing, over a period of time, of the extent of positions 
reduced—both voluntarily and involuntarily—as a 
result of competitive sourcing. The data reveal that 
while large numbers of positions were reduced, a 
small minority of those positions represent involun-
tary separations. This does not imply, however, that 
federal employees are minimally affected by com-
petitive sourcing. Issues of low morale, insufficient 
staffing, and feelings of unfairness can still pervade a 
workforce affected by competitions. Thus, this report 
concludes with recommendations for those con-
ducting these competitions—for federal employees 
to feel the process is fair, ensure that they are fully 
supported with training and that they can continue 
to work effectively to support their agency’s mis-
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